

MDROs: What, Why, and How?

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Disclosure

No conflicts of interest to disclose

Objectives

To define *WHAT* MDROs are.

To provide current *data* on MDROs.

To explain *WHY* MDROs exist.

To discuss the *relevance* of MDROs to clinical practice.

To discuss *HOW* pediatricians can help prevent the spread of MDROs.

Outline

What are MDROs?

What is the burden of MDROs?

What brings about MDROs?

What is the implication of MDROs in clinical practice?

What can we do to prevent MDROs?

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MULTIDRUG RESISTANT ORGANISMS

Microorganisms, predominantly bacteria that are resistant to one or more classes of antimicrobial agents.

MRSA Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*

VRE Vancomycin-resistant enterococci

ESBLs Extended-spectrum Beta-lactamases
(resistant to cephalosporins and monobactams)

PRSP Penicillin-resistant *Streptococcus pneumoniae*

“ESKAPE” pathogens

*E*nterococcus faecium

*S*taphylococcus aureus

*K*lebsiella pneumoniae

*A*cinetobacter baumannii

*P*seudomonas aeruginosa

*E*nterobacter species

What are MDROs?

Although the names of certain MDROs describe resistance to only one agent,

i.e. **MRSA**, **VRE**, these are frequently resistant to **MOST** available antimicrobial agents.

What are MDROs?

ARSP, DOH Philippines:

Resistance to one or more agents (drugs) in 3 or more classes of antimicrobial categories

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ARSP, DOH Philippines:

Resistance to one or more agents (drugs) in 3 or more classes of antimicrobial categories

K. pneumoniae, Resistant to:

B-lactam (*Ceftazidime, Piperacillin-Tazobactam*)

Aminoglycosides (*Amikacin, Gentamicin*)

Carbapenem (*Meropenem*)

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ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE

Global Report
on Surveillance

2014



World Health
Organization

AMR

Global Report on Surveillance, 2014

High proportion of resistance to common treatments reported in all regions

Bacteria commonly causing infections in hospitals and in the community

Bacterium/ Resistance	Typical Diseases	No. out of 194 Member States Providing Data	No. of WHO Regions with National Reports of 50% Resistance or More
<i>E. coli</i> vs 3 rd gen. CPN vs FQ	UTI BSI	86 92	5/6 5/6
<i>K. pneumoniae</i> vs 3 rd gen. CPN vs Carbapenems	Pneumonia UTI BSI	87 71	6/6 2/6
<i>S. aureus</i>	Wound infections BSI	85	5/6

Bacteria commonly causing infections in the community

Bacterium/ Resistance	Typical Diseases	No. out of 194 Member States Providing Data	No. of WHO Regions with National Reports of 50% Resistance or More
<i>S. pneumoniae</i> R to Penicillin	Pneumonia Meningitis Otitis	67	6/6
Nontyphoidal Salmonelle vs FQ	Foodborne diarrhea BSI	68	3/6
Shigella sp. vs FQ	Diarrhea	35	2/6

Antibiotic Resistance Threats

Burden of MDROs & Economic Impact:

US:

2 M people are affected/yr., 23,000 die
20 Billion direct costs, 35 Billion indirect costs

European Union


25,000 deaths/yr.

Overall societal costs about 1.5 billion Euros/year

Thailand

40,000 AMR infected patients/yr.
>30,000 deaths from blood infection
2.0 billion USD/year

http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/consumers/personal_home_5_1451036133.pdf (accessed 8-5-2013); extrapolated from Roberts RR, Hota B, Ahmad I, et al. Hospital and societal costs of antimicrobial-resistant infections in a Chicago teaching hospital: implications for antibiotic stewardship. Clin Infect Dis. 2009 Oct 15;49(8):1175-84



ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

2015 Data Summary Report

**Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance
Reference Laboratory**

Research Institute for Tropical Medicine
Department of Health
Philippines

ARSP 2015, DOH

E. coli

E. coli rates of resistance against the fluoroquinolones and 3rd generation CPNs have been increasing for the past years with resistance rates against ciprofloxacin at 39.2% (n=5,618) and ceftriaxone at 34.6% (n=5,458) for 2015.

Emerging resistance against the carbapenems are also reported for 2015 with rates of resistance at 4.2% for ertapenem (n=3,036); 3.5% for imipenem (n=6,132); and 3.4% for meropenem (n=5,794).

ARSP 2015, DOH

E. coli

Urinary *E. coli* isolates from outpatients remain susceptible to nitrofurantoin with rate of resistance at 3.1% (n= 814). Comparatively, urinary *E. coli* isolates from hospitalized patients show variable susceptibility to parenteral agents with rates of resistance ranging from 4.2% against amikacin (n=2105); and 5.7% against ertapenem (n=1241); to as high as 40.4% against ceftriaxone (n=1973).

ARSP 2015, DOH

ESBL E. coli

ESBL suspect rate is at 27% (5578 isolates).

Escherichia coli




Figure 44. Yearly ampicillin, ampi-sulbactam, ciprofloxacin and co-trimoxazole resistance rates of *Escherichia coli*, ARSP, 2006-2015

Escherichia coli




Figure 45. Yearly ceftriaxone, gentamicin and imipinem resistance rates of *Escherichia coli*, ARSP, 2006-2015

ARSP 2015, DOH

K. pneumoniae

Resistance to the carbapenems are rising with 2015 *Klebsiella* species resistance rates as high as 15.3% for ertapenem (n=4,041), 11.1% for imipenem (n=8,068) and 11.9% for meropenem (n=7,663).

ESBL

K. pneumoniae

Extended-spectrum β -lactamase suspect rates for 2015 is at 38% (n=8,407).

Klebsiella pneumoniae




Figure 49. Yearly amoxicillin-clavulanic acid, ceftriaxone and ciprofloxacin resistance rates of *Klebsiella pneumoniae*, ARSP, 2006-2015

Klebsiella pneumoniae




Figure 50. Yearly carbapenems resistance rates of *Klebsiella pneumoniae*, ARSP, 2006-2015

ARSP 2015, DOH

A. baumannii

Rate of resistance of *A. baumannii* is reported at 46.3% for ampicillin-sulbactam (n= 2,586) for 2015.

A. baumannii aminoglycoside resistance rates are at 31% for amikacin (n= 2,827) and 36.4% for gentamicin (n=3,358).

Resistance of *A. baumannii* against imipenem have been increasing in the past 10 years with rates of resistance for 2015 reported as high as 54.1% (n=3,421).

Acinetobacter baumannii




Figure 58. Yearly ampicillin-sulbactam, amikacin and gentamicin resistance rates of *Acinetobacter baumannii*, ARSP, 2006-2015

Acinetobacter baumannii




Figure 59. Yearly ciprofloxacin, imipinem and meropenem resistance rates of *Acinetobacter baumannii*, ARSP, 2006-2015

ARSP 2015, DOH

MDR

P. aeruginosa & *A. baumannii*

P. aeruginosa MDR rates for all isolates were at 22%.

A. baumannii MDR rates for all isolates were at 66%.

ARSP 2015, DOH

S. pneumoniae

Cumulative resistance rate of *S. pneumoniae* isolates from all specimen types reported for 2014 against penicillin, using meningitis breakpoints, was at 7.6% (n=369); 5% in 2013, 0% in 2010

ARSP 2015, DOH

S. pneumoniae

Penicillin resistance was at 9% for invasive (blood and CSF) isolates when analyzed using meningitis breakpoints but only 1% penicillin resistance rate for non-invasive isolates (non-CSF and non-blood) when analyzed using non-meningitis breakpoints.

There was no ceftriaxone-resistant *S. pneumoniae* reported for 2015.

Streptococcus pneumoniae




Figure 7. Yearly resistance rates of *Streptococcus pneumoniae*, ARSP, 2006-2015

ARSP 2015, DOH

MRSA

MRSA rate is at 62.6% (n= 3,555); 60.3% in 2014.

No confirmed vancomycin-resistant *S. aureus*.

Staphylococcus aureus




Figure 34. Yearly penicillin, oxacillin and vancomycin resistance rates of *Staphylococcus aureus*, ARSP, 2006-2015

ARSP 2015, DOH

VRE

Higher rates of ampicillin resistance 10.9% for *E. faecalis* (n=817), 78.1% for *E. faecium* (n= 301).

There were no confirmed reports of vancomycin-resistant *E. faecalis* or *E. faecium*.

Epidemiology

Antibiotic-resistant infections **can happen anywhere.**

Most infections happen in the general community.

Most deaths related to antibiotic resistance happen in healthcare settings.

Epidemiology

Prevalence of MDROs varies temporally, geographically, and by healthcare setting

Epidemiology

Type and level of care influence the prevalence of MDROs

ICUs at tertiary care facilities have a higher prevalence of MDRO infections than do non-ICU settings

Resistance rates are strongly correlated with hospital size, tertiary-level care, and facility type

Epidemiology

MDRO burden is greatest in adult hospital patients, but MDRO require similar control efforts in pediatric populations.

Saiman, L., Cronquist, A., Wu, F., Zhou, J., Rubenstein, D., Eisner, W., Kreiswirth, B. N., & Della-Latta, P. (2003) Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 24, 317-321.

Epidemiology

Point prevalence surveys, Pediatric Prevention Network
(8 US PICUs & 7 NICUs, 2000)

- ✓ 10-24% of patients were colonized with Ceftazidime or Aminoglycoside-resistant gram negative bacilli
- ✓ < 4% of patients were colonized with MRSA or VRE
- ✓ < 3% of patients were colonized with ESBL-producing gram negative bacilli

Siegel, et. Al. Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings, 2006.

Risk Factors

Severe illness

Underlying disease or condition such as diabetes, chronic kidney disease

Previous prolonged use of antibiotics

Invasive procedures (dialysis, use of medical devices)

Repeated contact with the healthcare system

Previous colonization with a MDRO

Elderly

Siegel, et. Al. Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings, 2006.

Outline

What are MDROs?

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What is the implication of MDROs in clinical practice?

What can we do to prevent MDROs?

**Why
do
they
exist?**

Why do they exist?

Widespread use of antibiotics, plus the natural growth of bacteria over time, has created a number of MDROs.

Use of antibiotics puts biological pressure on bacteria that promotes the development of resistance.

Every time someone takes an antibiotic they don't need, they increase their risk of developing a resistant infection in the future.

Evolution of MDROs

Developing Resistance

Timeline of Key Antibiotic Resistance Events


Dates are based upon early reports of resistance in the literature. In the case of pan drug-resistant (PDR)-*Acinetobacter* and *Pseudomonas*, the date is based upon reports of healthcare transmission or outbreaks. Note: penicillin was in limited use prior to widespread population usage in 1943.

ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE IDENTIFIED		ANTIBIOTIC INTRODUCED
penicillin-R <i>Staphylococcus</i>	1940	1943 penicillin
		1950 tetracycline
		1953 erythromycin
tetracycline-R <i>Shigella</i>	1959	
methicillin-R <i>Staphylococcus</i>	1962	1960 methicillin
penicillin-R pneumococcus	1965	
erythromycin-R <i>Streptococcus</i>	1968	1967 gentamicin
		1972 vancomycin
gentamicin-R <i>Enterococcus</i>	1979	
ceftazidime-R Enterobacteriaceae	1987	1985 imipenem and ceftazidime
vancomycin-R <i>Enterococcus</i>	1988	
levofloxacin-R pneumococcus	1996	1996 levofloxacin
imipenem-R Enterobacteriaceae	1998	
XDR tuberculosis	2000	2000 linezolid
linezolid-R <i>Staphylococcus</i>	2001	
vancomycin-R <i>Staphylococcus</i>	2002	
PDR- <i>Acinetobacter</i> and <i>Pseudomonas</i>	2004/5	2003 daptomycin
ceftriaxone-R <i>Neisseria gonorrhoeae</i>	2009	
PDR-Enterobacteriaceae		2010 ceftaroline
ceftaroline-R <i>Staphylococcus</i>	2011	




Developing Resistance

Timeline of Key Antibiotic Resistance Events



Developing Resistance

Timeline of Key Antibiotic Resistance Events



***T*he more we use them,
the more we lose them.**

Albrich et al EID 2004

How are MDROs Transmitted?

Epidemiologic evidence suggests that MDROs are carried from one person to another **via the hands of healthcare personnel.**

CDC (2002) MMWR 51(16), 1-44.

How are MDROs Transmitted?

In the healthcare setting, once MDROs are introduced, transmission and persistence of the organism is determined by:

Availability of vulnerable patients

Selective pressure exerted by antimicrobial use

Increased potential for transmission from colonized or infected patients

Impact of implementation and adherence to prevention efforts

CDC (2002) MMWR 51(16), 1-44.

How are MDROs Transmitted?

They can also spread from person-to-person through direct contact (touching oozing sores).

MDROs can also spread on objects such as medication cart handles, bed rails, bedside tables, IV poles, and catheters, to name a few.

CDC (2002) MMWR 51(16), 1-44.

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Implication

MDROs deserve special attention in healthcare facilities

In most instances (with the exception of MRSA), they have clinical manifestations similar to infections caused by susceptible pathogens

**OPTIONS FOR TREATING PATIENTS ARE
EXTREMELY LIMITED.**

*Stone, P. W., Gupta, A., Loughrey, M., Della-Latta, P., Cimiotti, J., Larson, E.,
Rubenstein, D., Saiman, L. (2003) Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 24, 601-606.*

Implication

Antibiotic-resistant infections **add considerable and avoidable costs** to the healthcare system.

They require prolonged treatments, extend hospital stays, necessitate additional doctor visits and healthcare use, and **result in greater disability and death** compared with infections that are easily treatable with antibiotics.

http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/consumers/personal_home_5_1451036133.pdf (accessed 8-5-2013); extrapolated from Roberts RR, Hota B, Ahmad I, et al. Hospital and societal costs of antimicrobial-resistant infections in a Chicago teaching hospital: implications for antibiotic stewardship. *Clin Infect Dis.* 2009 Oct 15;49(8):1175-84



Site of MDRO Infections

MDROs can cause infections in almost any part of the body:

- ✓ Bloodstream
- ✓ Lungs
- ✓ Urinary tract
- ✓ Wounds
- ✓ Skin
- ✓ Surgical site

New antibiotics are scarce

Over the last 30 years, no major new types of antibiotics have been developed



Treatment Options

Drug	Year Approved	Targeted Pathogens	Use & Resistance Trends
Quinupristin/ Dalfopristin	1999	Staphylococcus Streptococcus	gram-positive side effects are common, not a first choice
Moxifloxacin	1999	Enterobacteria* Staphylococcus Streptococcus	Broad-spectrum Cross-resistance among FQ
Linezolid	2000	Staphylococcus Enterococcus	Gram-positive
Ertapenem	2001	Enterobacteria Staphylococcus Streptococcus	CRE impacting drugs effectiveness
Gemifloxacin	2003	Enterobacteriaceae Streptococcus	Cross-resistance among FQ

Treatment Options

Drug	Year Approved	Targeted Pathogens	Use & Resistance Trends
Daptomycin	2003	Staphylococcus Streptococcus Enterococcus	gram-positive resistance emerging, low
Tigecycline	2005	Enterobacteria Staphylococcus Streptococcus Enterococci	MDR Gram- negatives resistance emerging, uncommon

Treatment Options

Drug	Year Approved	Targeted Pathogens	Use & Resistance Trends
Doripenem	2007	Enterobacteriaceae <i>Pseudomonas aeruginosa</i> Acinetobacter spp. Streptococcus spp.	Gram-negative
Telavancin	2008	Staphylococcus Streptococcus Enterococcus	Gram-positive SSTI
Ceftaroline	2010	Enterobacteriaceae Staphylococcus Streptococcus	MRSA NOT for ESBLs resistance emerging, low

Treatment Options

Polymyxins (Colistin)

Older class of antibiotics

Fell out of favor because of toxicity concerns

Now used as a “last resort” agent for treatment
MDR gram-negative infections

Treatment Options

There are currently no antibacterials in advanced development for highly resistant pathogens.

Paterson DL, Doi Y. A step closer to extreme drug resistance (XDR) in gram-negative bacilli. Clin Infect Dis 2007; 45:1179–81.

INVITED ARTICLE


REVIEWS OF ANTI-INFECTIVE AGENTS

Louis D. Saravolatz, Section Editor

Treatment of Multidrug-Resistant Gram-Negative Infections in Children

Alice J. Hsu¹ and Pranita D. Tamma²

¹Department of Pharmacy, Division of Pediatric Pharmacy, The Johns Hopkins Hospital, and ²Department of Pediatrics, Division of Infectious Diseases, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland



Treatment Options

LIMITED TREATMENT OPTIONS FOR MDROs.

Bacteria will inevitably find ways of resisting the antibiotics we develop, which is why **aggressive action is needed NOW!**

Outline

What are MDROs?

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How Can Infection Be Prevented?

Four Core Actions to Prevent Antibiotic Resistance:

1. Prevent Infections and Prevent the spread of Resistance

Immunization Guidelines, safe food preparation, hand hygiene

2. Tracking

ARSP, DOH Philippines is used by healthcare facilities to report infections, antibiotic use, and resistance.

How Can Infection Be Prevented?

Four Core Actions to Prevent Antibiotic Resistance:

3. Improving Antibiotic Prescribing (Stewardship)

Get cultures before starting antibiotics

Antibiotic Best Practices (indication, dose, duration)

4. Developing New Drugs and Diagnostic Tests

Prevention and Control of MDROs

Successful control of MDROs has been documented using a variety of combined interventions:

Improvements in hand hygiene practices

Use of Contact Precautions until patients are culture-negative for a target MDRO, use of proper PPE

Temporary unit closure

Prevention and Control of MDROs

Successful control of MDROs has been documented using a variety of combined interventions:

Active surveillance cultures (to identify those who are colonized)

Enhanced environmental cleaning (for frequently touched surfaces)

Adequate staff to patient ratio

In-service education of staff

Improvements in communication about patients with MDROs within and between healthcare facilities

Philippine Situation

Country Situation Analysis, 2012

1. No comprehensive AMR plan
2. Need to improve surveillance
3. Securing the drug supply chain
4. Need for positive changes in knowledge and practices of prescribers, dispensers and patients
5. Strengthen sanitation, infection control and prevention
6. Research on discovery and development

Philippine Action Plan

Administrative Order no. 42 s. 2014,

*Creating an **Inter-Agency Committee** for the
Formulation and Implementation of the **National Plan
to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance** in the
Philippines*



The Philippine Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance: One Health Approach



Philippine Action Plan

3-year comprehensive plan

Emphasis on **“One Health Strategy”**

The causation of AMR is interrelated and inter-sectoral thereby requiring collaborative multidisciplinary work at local, national, and global levels to attain optimal health for humans, animals and the environment

Philippine Action Plan

Key Strategies:

1. Commit to a comprehensive, financed national plan with accountability and civil society engagement.
2. Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity.

Philippine Action Plan

Key Strategies:

3. Ensure uninterrupted access to essential medicines of assured quality.
4. Regulate and promote rational use of medicines in the human and animal health sectors and ensure proper patient care.

Philippine Action Plan

Key Strategies:

5. Enhance infection prevention and control across all settings
6. Foster innovations and research and development.
7. Development of a Risk Communication Plan to combat AMR.

Department Personnel Order No. 2014-4245

Creation of the National Antibiotic Guidelines Committee
(**NAGCom**)

NAGCom

FUNCTION:

1. Develop the National Antibiotic Guidelines for Primary Care and for Hospitals
2. Provide trainings/lectures on the dissemination of the Guidelines

NAGCom

Chair: Dr. Estrella Paje-Villar/Mediadora Saniel

Members:

PIDSP ☺

PSMID (Dr. Mari Rose De Los Reyes)

RITM (Dr. Celia Carlos)

National Center for Disease Prevention and Control
(Dr. Rosalind Vianzon)

Formulary Executive Council (Dr. Cecilia Lazarte)

Philippine Pharmacists Association (Dr. Olivia Limuaco)

Philippine Hospital Infection Control Society (Dr. Benilda Galvez)

UP College of Medicine (Dr. Mary Ann Lansang)

National Epidemiology Center (Dr. Vito Roque)

National Center for Health Facilities and Development
(Dr. Cynthia Fabregas)

NAGCom

PIDSP Board Members

PIDSP Fellows/Diplomates:

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Dental: Cecilia Lazarte

GI: Celia Carlos

Ocular: Carmina delos Reyes

RTI: Carmina delos Reyes

Sepsis: Mary Ann Banez/Pia Torres

SSTI: Grace Go/Edna Mallorca

STI: Rosemarie Arciaga/Joanne de Jesus/Tricia Carino

NAGCom

Summary of Guidelines

Guideline	Status
Filariasis & Schistosomiasis	Finished and should be available
GIT Infections	Finished and should be available
Surgical Prophylaxis	Finished and should be available
UTI	Finished and should be available
Tuberculosis	For lay-outing, will be out soon

NAGCom

Summary of Guidelines

Guideline	Status
Dental & Oral	For Finalization by the Committee
Leprosy	For Finalization by the Committee
Malaria	For Finalization by the Committee
RTI	For Finalization by the Committee
STI	For Finalization by the Committee

NAGCom

Summary of Guidelines

Guideline	Status
Blood/Cardiovascular	For Public Consultation due by March 10, 2017
Bone & Joints	due by Feb. 20, 2017
CNS	due by Feb. 10, 2017
Eye	due by Feb. 20, 2017
SSTI	due by Feb. 20, 2017

NAGCom

Summary of Guidelines

<http://icamr.doh.gov.ph>

<http://pharmadiv.doh.gov.ph>

NAGCom Guidelines, Sepsis

Sepsis in Children

Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome (SIRS)

The presence of two or more of the following four criteria, one of which must be abnormal temperature or white blood cell count:

1. Core temperature (rectal, bladder, oral, or central catheter probe) $> 38.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ (101.3°F) or $< 36^{\circ}\text{C}$ (96.8°F)
2. Tachycardia or bradycardia
3. Mean RR > 2 standard deviations for age or mechanical ventilation for an acute process not related to an underlying neuromuscular disease or to general anesthesia
4. Abnormal WBC count or $> 10\%$ immature neutrophils

Sepsis: SIRS in the presence of or caused by suspected or proven infection

NAGCom Guidelines, Sepsis

Healthcare-associated sepsis

Etiology	Preferred Regimen	Comments
Gram-negative bacilli <i>S. aureus</i>	Ceftazidime 150-200 mg/kg/d q8h (max 6 g/d) OR Cefepime 100-150 mg/kg/d q8h, max 4-6 g/d OR Piperacillin-Tazobactam 300 mg/kg/d of piperacillin q8h (max 9-16 g/d) OR Meropenem 60-120 mg/kg/d q8h (max 1.5-6g/d) WITH OR WITHOUT Aminoglycoside Amikacin 15 mg/kg/d OD WITH OR WITHOUT Vancomycin 40-60 mg/kg/d q6h (max 2-4 gm/d)	Choice of empiric antibiotic therapy should be based on current antimicrobial susceptibility pattern within an institution For severe infections with <i>Pseudomonas</i> and/or if antimicrobial resistance is suspected If with previous surgery, IV therapy or other instrumentation and staphylococcal infection is suspected

The Threat is REAL!



What MDs can do

What MDs can do

Know if patients with MDROs are hospitalized at your facility, and be aware of MDRO risks.

Ask if your patients have received medical care somewhere else.

Follow infection control recommendations with every patient – (Standard and contact precautions for MDROs).

What MDs can do

Whenever possible, dedicate rooms, equipment, and staff to MDRO patients.

Prescribe antibiotics wisely.

Use culture results to modify prescriptions if needed.

Remove temporary medical devices as soon as possible.

What Patients Can Do

Tell your doctor if you have been hospitalized in another facility.

Take antibiotics only as prescribed; do not recycle or share prescriptions

Insist that everyone wash their hands before touching you.

Do not demand treatment for conditions when antibiotics are not needed and will not help.

Call for Stewardship

Antibiotics are a limited resource.

The more that antibiotics are used today, the less likely they will still be effective in the future.

Health professionals should adopt the principles of responsible antibiotic use (antibiotic stewardship).

Stewardship is a commitment to always use antibiotics only when they are necessary to treat, and prevent disease; to choose the right antibiotics; and to administer them in the right way in every case.

Call for Stewardship

Effective stewardship ensures that every patient gets the maximum benefit from the antibiotics, avoids unnecessary harm, helps preserve the life-saving potential of these drugs for the future and **prevent the emergence of MDROs.**

Responsible use of antibiotics have not only demonstrated these benefits but have also been shown to improve outcomes and save healthcare costs.

Think
Before
You Ink!

Mission: Disaster Response Officer

HELP FIGHT

Multi Drug Resistant Organisms

What we learned in the last 30 minutes...

MDROs are organisms which are resistant to one or more agents (drugs) in 3 or more classes of antimicrobial categories

There is a high proportion of resistance to common treatments reported in all regions

(AMR Global Report on Surveillance, 2014)

MDROs exist because use of antibiotics puts biological pressure on bacteria that promotes the development of resistance.

What we learned in the last 30 minutes...

Infections with MDROs deserve special attention.

There are currently no antibacterials in advanced development for highly resistant pathogens.

There are core actions to prevent the development of resistance and there are proven control interventions once MDRO infection has set in.

We hold the solution to this problem.

Thank you!